When the Informant is on the Other Foot

Virtually any time a suspected Muslim terrorist is arrested in an investigation involving an informant, national Islamist groups decry the use of "agent provocateurs" and raise the issue of entrapment.

There's been little such concern in the wake of the arrest this week of nine members of a Christian militia movement in Michigan. The Hutaree cited Scripture in explaining that is was preparing for confrontation with the anti-Christ. Initial reports also indicated that Hutaree members may have made threatening statements about Muslim targets.

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) applauded the FBI for the arrests.

An arraignment in Detroit for the defendants makes it clear that the FBI infiltrated the Hutaree with an undercover agent. ABC's Dan Harris reports that the agent "managed to penetrate the strange and violent parallel universe of the Hutaree."

CBS cites a tape made by the undercover agent that was played in court Wednesday. In it, Hutaree leader David Brian Stone tells his followers that "Now it's time to strike and take our nation back so we will be free of tyranny. The war will come whether we are ready or not."

That sounds an awful lot like the preaching Daniel Patrick Boyd offered to his followers. In that case, Boyd, his two sons and others, felt obliged to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam. An FBI informant recorded Boyd's fiery sermons and the group's training sessions.

Whether or not they are guilty as charged, the Boyd defendants were well armed an appeared bent on violence. In that case, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) seemed more concerned about the use of an informant. It issued a statement saying that it was "monitoring the situation and working to ensure that future policy-making on domestic terrorism balance national security with civil liberties."

The Hutaree members are accused of plotting vicious attacks on local law enforcement – killing a police officer during a traffic stop and then ambushing dozens of others who attended the slain officer's funeral.

Similarly, Detroit Imam Luqman Abdullah preached offensive jihad and used his mosque for training in martial arts and with firearms. He was recorded in a 2004 sermon yelling, "Police, so what? Police die too! Feds die too!" and "Do not carry a pistol if you're going to give it up to police. You give them a bullet."

CAIR has criticized virtually every aspect of the Abdullah case, from the role of informants to references to the imam's religious motivations to his death after he fired a gun as FBI agents moved in to arrest him.

It's clear the FBI agent who infiltrated the Hutaree put his life at risk to protect the public from violent extremists. It seems to validate the FBI's insistence that it investigates people, not religions. Perhaps it will prompt reconsideration by Islamist activists who reflexively criticize similarly courageous acts by agents and informants investigating radical Muslims.

Appeals Court Grants PLO's Second Chance in Lawsuit Over American Murders

A federal appeals court has ordered the reconsideration of a lawsuit against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestine Authority (PA). The ruling in the case, Ungar v. The Palestine Liberation Organization, vacates an earlier default judgment entered against the PLO and the PA, and forces the lower court to hear arguments why the groups shouldn't have to pay a $116 million verdict against it for the 1996 death of an American couple in Israel.

Yarun Ungar, a U.S. citizen, was driving home from a wedding with his wife Efrat, and their nine-month old son when Hamas members riddled their car with machine-gun fire, killing the couple. The estate then filed a civil suit against the PLO and the PA under the Anti-Terrorism Act in U.S. District Court in Providence, Rhode Island.

But the defendants neither answered the complaint nor participated in discovery. Instead, they tried to ignore the suit, unwilling to accept the legitimacy of U.S. courts over the cases. That prompted a federal judge to grant a default judgment of $116 million in favor of the plaintiffs.

Since that time, however, the PLO and PA - in an effort to improve relations with the U.S. - have said they now are willing to defend themselves in court. The organizations insist they have had a good-faith change of heart and that they have legitimate, merit-based arguments to defend themselves, the ruling states. They emphasize the unique nature of the case, its political ramifications and its potential impact on international relations.

In reviewing the request to vacate the lower court, the First Circuit ruled that the lower court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to void the judgment. Agreeing with the defendants, the court suggested that the issue is simply too important to allow the default judgment to stand.

The decision, issued by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, is only the most recent development since the PLO and the PA changed its legal tactics and decided to start defending civil suits filed against it rather than stonewalling. As we previously reported, a federal judge in the District of Columbia granted a similar motion to vacate an entry of default against the PA and PLO.

Chicago Cab Driver Charged with Funding Al Qaeda

A Chicago cab driver was charged Friday with providing material support to al Qaeda by attempting to funnel funds overseas to the terrorist group. Pakistan-born Raja Lahrasib Khan, who became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1988, also discussed attacking a stadium in the United States in August, according to a 35-page affidavit filed in the Northern District of Illinois.

The affidavit claims Khan had a long-term association with al Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri. During meetings in Pakistan, Kashmiri told Khan that he worked for al Qaeda and received orders from Osama bin Laden. Kashmiri also told Khan that he was training operatives to conduct attacks in the United States. Kashmiri then showed Khan a video of an improvised explosive device being detonated and said that he needed money to obtain equipment from the "black market."

Last November, Khan sent $950 from Chicago to someone in Pakistan and instructed him to give approximately $300 to "Lala," which means "older brother" in Urdu. It also served as a moniker for Kashmiri. On February 8, an undercover informant met with Khan and a second unnamed individual at a restaurant in Chicago. During the meeting, Khan told the informant he had met with Kashmiri in northwest Pakistan in 2008. Khan also warned the informant that he suspected their telephone conversations were being monitored and if they were queried about "Lala" they should say that they were referring to Khan's older brother.

In a subsequent meeting February 23, Khan and the undercover agent discussed Osama bin Laden. At the meeting Khan allegedly said, "I love Osama bin Laden, he says fifty years we have been, you know tasting…now America will taste that [Emphasis added].

In another meeting March 11, Khan discussed the stadium bombing idea, in an area "where security did not check cars." At the meeting, which was recorded by the FBI, Khan told an unnamed individual, "You know, put one bag here, one there, one there, you know three, four, five different places, you know, boom, boom, boom, boom." In another meeting March 18, Khan was recorded discussing news media reports about an al Qaeda member "Yemeni" being martyred in a U.S. missile strike in Pakistan and expressed concern about Kashmiri's safety.

Ilyas Kashmiri faces criminal charges along with two other Chicago residents, David Headley and Tahawwur Rana, and a retired major in the Pakistani military, for their alleged participation in the plotting of the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 and a plot to attack the facilities and employees of the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten. The investigation is however unrelated to the investigation leading to Khan's arrest.

Read the full affidavit here.

Terror Forecast: Chili Today and Hot Tamale

One of the world's spiciest chilis is being weaponized for use in fighting terrorists. This, according to an article published by the Guardian newspaper.

The weaponized chilis known as Bhut Jolokia or "Ghost Chili" has been rated by the Guinness Book of World Records as one of the spiciest chilis in the world, more than 400 times hotter than Tabasco sauce. And as the Indian government is trying to prove, in a weaponized form, it can be an extremely effective counter-insurgency device.

Developed by the Indian government's Defense Research Lab in Assam, the paste of the chili has been converted into a tear gas and smoke grenade to be used to flush out terrorists hiding in caves in Northeast India. In its current form, the weaponized chilis are deployed and dispersed from grenade-like canisters. The smoke has even been used to obscure the sight of snipers using night vision goggles.

This new weapon is currently being used against 24 ethnic separatist groups in Northeast India, however, the government has already indicated that once it is implemented it may serve as a useful tool in a variety of settings—including counter-terrorism.

The BBC quotes an Indian scientist, who says the chili bombs are effective, but not deadly.

"Its pungent smell will force the target victim to throw up and the eyes will burn like hell, but all without any long-term damage."

Lashkar Threatens Slaughter of Kashmiris Serving India

A Pakistan-based terrorist group is threatening to slaughter members of a community in Kashmir who serve in the Indian police or military. The warning from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) came in the form of posters spread across the district. They also threaten to kill five Indian Special Police Officials.

The threats come after eight top LeT commanders have died at the hands of Indian security forces since January.

Earlier this week at a conference in Kotli district in Azad Kashmir, LeT and Kashmiri terrorist groups pledged support to the Kashmiri people in their freedom struggle against Indian rule and labeled the Indian-Pakistan peace talks a "hoax."

"The secret of success and freedom from the oppressor lies in jihad and not at the negotiating tables," LeT leader Abdul Wahid Kashmiri said.

A declaration issued at the conference criticized Pakistan for being naïve in pursuing friendly relations with the U.S. and India. "We are afraid that Pakistan may subject itself to another debacle bigger than that of its dismemberment in 1971 by considering India and U.S. as its friends," the declaration said.

Bangladesh, formerly West Pakistan, separated into an independent state in 1971 with support from India.

In addition to the LeT, participants at the conference included Kashmiri terrorist groups such as Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Tehreek-ul Mujahideen, Al-Badar Mujahideen, Hizb-e-Islami Jammu Kashmir, Jamiat-ul Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz Force and the Al Jihad Force. HuM, JeM and the LeT are on the U.S. list of designated terrorist groups.

UN, U.S. Treasury Freeze Iraqi Jihadist's Assets

The Treasury Department on Thursday designated veteran jihadist Muthanna Harith al-Dari for providing support to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) - a terrorist group fighting to sabotage democratic elections in that country, where more than 90,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed.

The designation occurred under Executive Order 13224, which freezes assets of terror supporters living under U.S. jurisdiction and bars U.S. persons from "engaging in any transactions with those individuals."

Also on Thursday, the United Nations 1267 Committee (which is responsible with overseeing international sanctions on Al Qaeda and Taliban supporters around the world) announced it is adding al-Dari to its target list.

Treasury "is pleased to have partnered with the Government of Iraq to list al-Dari at the UN's 1267 Committee today, and we will continue our aggressive efforts to isolate those terrorist actors and networks that seek to threaten the stability of Iraq," said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey.

Al-Dari, who is thought to divide his time between Iraq and Jordan, provides "operational guidance for attacks against Iraqi Forces and Coalition Forces in Iraq," according to Treasury.

As of August 2008, al-Dari sought to reinvigorate Iraq's terrorist insurgency by providing training to any insurgent group fighting coalition forces. He attended training meetings in Syria that were conducted by Al Qaeda in Iraq, during which he described the organization's attack plans to jihadist trainees.

As of October 2008, al-Dasri "provided $1 million to an AQI member who actively recruits Iraqis in Syria and al-Anbar province to support AQI, instructing the recruiter to tell new AQI recruits that they would be paid up to $10,000 upon completion of their training in Syria," according to the Treasury Department. "Additionally, as of 2008, al-Dari financed an AQI cell that called for fighting against the Iraqi Army and Multinational Forces-Iraq."

In another instance, al-Dari "provided funding to an improvised explosive device (IED) cell leader in order to conduct IED operations targeting Coalition Forces along a highway."

Obama Administration: Drone Attacks Lawful

After months of controversy, the Obama administration has finally begun laying out the legal justifications for its expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs" or "drones") in targeting terrorists.

Since 2002, the United States has used drones to conduct targeted killings of terrorist operatives overseas. The programs, conducted by both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, have been carried out in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Despite the effectiveness of UAVs, their use has not been without criticism.

Critics have argued that from a policy-standpoint, the use of drones is counterproductive because more than one third of those killed by drones are civilians. One academic has gone so far as to suggest that CIA drone pilots could be categorized as war criminals under the Geneva Convention. But perhaps most controversial has been the refusal of both the Bush and Obama administrations to lay out the legal justification for the program.

Among the concerns of attorneys for civil liberties groups is the potential that the drone program may be used to target American citizens abroad. Testifying before a Congressional Intelligence committee, Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair acknowledged that government agencies may kill U.S. citizens abroad who are involved in terrorist activities if they are "taking action that threatens Americans."

In response to the public criticism and legal challenges, the administration has been promising to explain the legal justifications for its use of drones. And finally, in a keynote speech at the American Society of International Law's annual conference, that promise was fulfilled.

Harold Koh, a vocal critic of Bush administration's counter-terrorism policies, now serving as legal adviser to the Obama administration, offered the first public legal justification for its drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. As Koh explained:

"the U.S. is in armed conflict with al-Qaida as well as the Taliban and associated forces in response to the horrific acts of 9/11…and may use force consistent with its right to self-defense under international law….Whether a person becomes a threat depends on various considerations, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses."

While no specific targets have been named, there a few likely candidates for what has been pejoratively termed "extrajudicial killings." Adam Gadahn, an American convert to Islam is currently serving as a spokesperson for al Qaida, who has for several years called for attacks on U.S. military and civilian targets. Omar Hammami, an American from Daphne, Alabama, has joined up with al Shabaab in Somalia and is currently assisting as a top recruiter for the terrorist group both at home and abroad. Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical imam from New Mexico is now in hiding in Yemen, after having been connected to the September 11^th attacks, the Fort Hood shooting, and most recently, Jihad Jane.

Questioning the legal justification for the drone attacks, and highlighting the potential for use on American citizens, groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union have come out swinging. Back in January 13, 2009, the ACLU filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act seeking:

"information about the legal basis in domestic, foreign, and international law for the use of drones to conduct targeted killings. We request information regarding the rules and standards that the Armed Forces and the CIA use to determine when and where these weapons may be used, the targets they may be used again, and the process in place to decide whether their use is legally permissible in particular circumstances, especially in the face of anticipated civilian casualties. We also seek information about how these rules and standards are implemented and enforced."

After having received no response from administration officials, the ACLU filed suit on Tuesday, demanding that a court order the government to comply with the FOIA request.

While Koh's speech is unlikely to satisfy critics of the program, it is the first step in what will likely be a lengthy public debate on the legality and efficacy of unmanned drones in the war on terror.

DOJ Seen Nothing Which "Exonerates" CAIR

One word from the Department of Justice speaks volumes about its suspicion surrounding the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).

As Politico's Josh Gerstein reports, Arizona Sen. Jon Kyl sent a host of questions to Attorney General Eric Holder after a recent hearing. One sought an explanation for a speech Holder gave last fall to a group which includes CAIR representatives.

The FBI broke off contact with CAIR in 2008 as a result of evidence presented at the trial of the Holy Land Foundation, which linked the organization to the terror group Hamas. Since then, a federal grand jury has subpoenaed records removed from CAIR offices as part of what appears to be a criminal investigation into the organization.

Holder wasn't aware of CAIR's participation in the group he spoke to, the DOJ response said.

Asked whether there was any "new evidence that exonerates CAIR from the allegations that it provides financial support to designated terrorist organizations," the DOJ response couldn't be more simple or direct.

"No."

CAIR denies any connection to Hamas or terrorism, but this marks the second time in a month that DOJ has publicly expressed its doubt. In a letter to four members of Congress last month, an official pointed to trial transcripts and exhibits from the Holy Land trial "which demonstrated a relationship among CAIR, individual CAIR founders, and the Palestine Committee. Evidence was also introduced that demonstrated a relationship between the Palestine Committee and HAMAS, which was designated as a terrorist organization in 1995."

Despite Holder's apparent faux-pas in engaging CAIR, the Justice Department said the speech did not represent a change on the DOJ's attitude towards CAIR. The DOJ's response noted:

"Our law enforcement efforts will be more successful – and our communities will be safer – if we in law enforcement work closely with those we serve and if those communities cooperate with us. This speech, which was widely attended and open to the public, offered an important opportunity to encourage and support these types of partnerships."

Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca made a show of meeting with CAIR officials this week, telling reporters that "CAIR is not a terrorist-supporting organization. That is my experience. That is my interaction. And if you want to promote that, you're on your own."

DOJ officials, who possess the evidence, clearly differ.

Underwear Bomber was Once Denied U.S. Visa

An American consular official in Lagos denied underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab a visa to enter the United States after the Nigerian provided false information on a 2004 visa application, but was overruled by a supervisor, the Washington Post reported Thursday.

Abdulmutallab first applied for U.S. visa in Togo, but was told he must apply at a location closer to his residence in Nigeria. When he returned to Lagos, Abdulmutallab filed an application which incorrectly stated that he had never been denied a visa.

Upon learning that this was false, the consular official denied Abdulmutallab a U.S. visa. But that decision was overturned by a supervisor. Because the matter was considered resolved, it did not come up again in 2008 when Abdulmutallab sought a new visa to enter the U.S.

He used that visa to board United Airlines Flight 253 Christmas Day in Amsterdam, and then tried to blow up the plane shortly before it landed in Detroit. Passengers and flight crew members subdued Abdulmutallab before he could detonate a bomb concealed in his underwear.

The decision to overrule the visa denial was not mentioned in the Obama Administration's report on the Christmas Day plot that was issued in early January. It found that the "most significant failures and shortcomings "by the intelligence community fell into three broad categories:

* A failure "to assign responsibility and accountability" for following up information on "high priority" threats;

* A failure of intelligence analysis, in which U.S. counterterrorism agencies "failed before December 25 to identify, correlate, and fuse into a coherent story all of the discrete pieces of intelligence held by the U.S. government related to an emerging terrorist plot;"

* Failing "to identify intelligence" in the government's possession "that would have allowed Mr. Abulmutallab to be watchlisted, and potentially prevented from boarding an aircraft bound for the United States."

Administration officials told the Post that the 2004 incident involving Abdulmutallab was not included in a recent review of his attempted bombing because the move to overturn the original denial didn't seem out of the ordinary. They said the administration's review found that consular officials operated in accordance with the rules and policies at the time.

"We always want to better anticipate threats. And since December we've continued to go back over this case and try to apply the lessons learned," a senior State Department official said.

MPAC Terrorism Report Misses the Point

A report released by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), titled "Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States," concludes that the existence of non-Muslim domestic terrorists demands a reevaluation of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Unsurprisingly, the report is light on facts, heavy on rhetoric, and ambivalent about the irony of MPAC's call for greater cooperation between the American Muslim community and U.S. law enforcement.

Among the report's conclusions:

• There were 51 total plots by domestic non-Muslim perpetrators against the United States, and 29 total plots by domestic and international Muslim perpetrators since 9/11.
• Since President Obama's election on November 4, 2008 there have been 25 terror plots by non-Muslim domestic extremists and 9 plots by Muslim domestic and international extremists.

Although we give MPAC the benefit of the doubt that its statistics are accurate, it is impossible to judge the underlying methodology used to categorize attacks without reference to the specific cases. MPAC's online report referred to an appendix containing citations, but it appears that appendix has not been posted so for now we simply take their word for it. Despite the absence of MPAC's "Post 9/11 Database," the report itself provides some disturbing insight into how cases were categorized.

Citing an editorial by Karen Greenberg and Francsca Laguardia, MPAC identifies what it apparently agrees are the three "indicators of serious danger:

• Training in a terrorist camp
• Association with al Qaida
• Intent and ability to use a weapon of mass destruction

While these are indeed serious indicators that danger is afoot, they are merely demonstrative rather than exhaustive. To suggest anything less, as MPAC does, is not only intellectually dishonest, but dangerous. Consider the following.

The MPAC report focuses too much on the "bomb thrower"—the militant with an "intent and ability to use a weapon of mass destruction" who is actually ready and willing to die for their Islamist ideology. However, if the Department of Justice can prevent these militants from getting their hands on money, weapons, communication equipment, etc., they can effectively cripple terrorist organizations. That is why it is so important to strike at the domestic and international support structure of terrorist groups. Despite the importance of these "material support" prosecutions, MPAC has consistently advocated on behalf of those who provide financial assistance to terrorist groups.

Similarly, MPAC apparently believes that the United States should only be concerned with Islamic terrorism connected to al Qaida. While the law enforcement focus may appear to be al Qaida-centric since the attacks of September 11, there are currently 45 organizations designated by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Among the ranks of these international villains are groups such as Hamas and Hizballah, two groups which MPAC has repeatedly defended as "resistance movements."

Perhaps most disconcerting however, is MPAC's reliance on "attendance at a training camp" as an indicator of the severity of a potential threat. This demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the evolving nature of terrorism. Those wishing to engage in terrorism in the United States no longer need to attend terrorist training camps abroad. Now, with the use of developing technologies, terrorists can engage in virtual-based learning from everything to handling weapons to bomb making.

Setting aside that MPAC's description of the threat hints at faulty categorization of terrorist incidents, the conclusions and policy suggestions reveal at least a hint of doublespeak. Take for example MPAC's call for expanded community policing initiatives. Citing the Department of Justice, MPAC explains:

"collaborative partnerships between the law enforcement agency and the individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police."

While community policing is an important tool in the battle against domestic and foreign terrorism, effective implementation of these programs has been undercut by the actions of groups like MPAC. On the one hand, MPAC recognizes that:

"one of the benefits of trusting partnerships is community members feeling comfortable enough to step forward and provide critical information to prevent a crime, including terrorism."

However, MPAC has some serious explaining to do regarding its role in establishing these necessary "trusting partnerships." The organization has repeatedly sought to portray all U.S. counter-terrorism efforts as part of a broader "War on Islam."

As an organization that demands law enforcement reliance on community sympathy and cooperation, MPAC contradicts itself with its creative definition of terrorism and attempts to sow distrust with law enforcement agencies.

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