Holy Land Prosecution Lives On

Federal prosecutors have unsealed a 2008 indictment charging a Dearborn, Mich. man of lying to the FBI about his involvement with the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), a charity designated a supporter of terrorism by the Treasury Department in 2001.

Five of HLF's leaders were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 15 to 65 years in May for illegally routing more than $12 million to the Hamas terror organization.

Mohamad Mustapha Ali Masfaka, a native of Syria, was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement on Thursday as he attempted to cross from Canada into the United States in Detroit. Prosecutors unsealed the indictment Friday charging that Masfaka falsely denied having been a paid Detroit representative of HLF during the 1990s.

When FBI agents in Dearborn interviewed him in 2003, Masfaka said he worked for the HLF in 1997 and 1998, but only as a singer in a band that performed at fundraising events.

The indictment also alleges that Masfaka "also falsely told FBI agents that he never received payment directly" from the HLF. But authorities say they found five checks worth $5,000 that were written to Masfaka by HLF officials.

According to the indictment, Masfaka repeatedly lied or omitted information when asked about his connections to the HLF by the FBI and immigration authorities. Masfaka is accused of making false statements in his application for U.S. citizenship.

If convicted, he faces up to 23 years in prison and up to $750,000 in fines.

Evidence at the trial showed that the HLF was part of a broad Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy in the United States called the Palestine Committee, which was to serve Hamas with "media, money and men

Justice Department Winning the War on Terror

Despite claims by critics that the U.S. government needs to revamp its national security policies in order to be effective, a new report out by New York University School of Law suggests that the Department of Justice has been doing an excellent job of investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and convicting those involved in acts of terrorism.

The report collected and analyzed data over the past eight years to evaluate the success of U.S. criminal prosecutions against terrorists. The results are staggering—88% of those indicted for a crime relating to terrorism were convicted by either a guilty plea or after trial.

One reason or the success over the years has been an evolution in the Justice Department's strategy towards terrorism. As the report explains:

"Since 9/11, the Department of Justice's understanding of terrorism cases has grown exponentially in terms of its patience in building a case, its understanding of the threats posed by terrorists, and its willingness to focus on terrorism and other serious charges. The early practice of making high-profile arrests, while prosecuting few terrorism charges—which brought into question the capacity of the DOJ to try terrorism-related crimes—has largely been addressed."

The renewed vigor with which these cases have been brought, and the continuing reexamination of methods for successfully investigating and prosecuting these cases has led to an impressive track record. While there will continue to be a debate as to the appropriate forum in which to try those accused of acts of terrorism, this report shows that federal criminal prosecutions are a powerful tool for incapacitating terrorists and gathering intelligence.

Potential LeT Hang Glider Attack has Precedent

India is on heightened alert for new terrorist attacks by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Among the concerns, the Times of India reported, is that the LeT has acquired more than 50 hang-gliders, possibly for use in an air-borne terrorist attack. The information prompted Indian officials to impose tighter air security in the days leading up to Indian Republic Day. Although news of these plans surprised many in the Indian security services, such an attack would not be unprecedented.

The use of hang-gliders by terrorist groups, although sounding like something out of a James Bond film, is not completely unheard of. On November 15, 1987, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command undertook a similar attack aimed at Israel. The attack, known as the "night of the gliders" was undertaken by two PFLP-GC guerrillas with AK-47 assault rifles, pistols, and hand grenades. The attackers hit at the Gibor army camp near Kiryat Shmona and resulted in the deaths of six soldiers and the wounding of many others.

Although the attackers were eventually shot and killed, the incident revealed a security gap that the Israel Defense Forces immediately closed. Similarly, upon identifying the potential for such an attack in India, a number of steps have been taken that will greatly reduce the likelihood of a potential attack by air.

"Toronto 18" Cell Members Sentenced in Terror Plot

There was a great deal of activity this week in the case of the "Toronto 18" - a terror cell broken up in 2006, which conspired to attack public buildings and murder Canadian politicians.

Zakaria Amara, 24, the leader of the group - which planned to detonate truck bombs outside the Toronto offices of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Toronto Stock Exchange and an Ontario military base - was sentenced to life in prison on Monday. He will be eligible for parole in 2016 - 10 years from the day of his arrest.

Amara confessed to masterminding the plot to detonate fertilizer bombs in U-Haul vans. He asked an undercover informant to help him purchase ammonium nitrate, the same bomb used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing which killed 168 people.

Amara's roles in the conspiracy included researching how to build a remote-controlled detonator and becoming the leader of a terrorist training camp. To kill the maximum number of people, he planned to put metal chips inside the bombs and detonate them at times when the target areas were crowded.

The goal of the attacks was to put pressure on the government to withdraw Canadian troops from Afghanistan.

Another conspirator, Saad Gaya, 22, was sentenced on Monday to 12 years in prison. ABC News reported that because "Gaya will receive two-for-one credit based on the years he served since his arrest in 2006, and extra credit for 14 months spent in solitary confinement, he has less than another four and a half years in prison."

Under Canadian parole standards, Gaya will be eligible for parole after serving 18 months – one- third of his remaining sentence.

On Wednesday, another member of the "Toronto 18" pled guilty to charges of participating in the terrorist group. Amin Mohamed Durrani took part in a plot to establish an armed, Al-Qaeda-type terror cell in Toronto "and then to create some sort of mayhem that would scare the Canadian public into withdrawing troops from Afghanistan," Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News Security Correspondent Bill Gillespie reported Wednesday.

The plot also involved storming Parliament Hill in Ottawa and beheading politicians, among them Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

Durrani, 23, was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison for his crimes. Taking into account the time he has already spent in custody, he became eligible for release on Thursday – receiving in effect a one-day sentence.

On Thursday, Prime Minister Harper said he understands why Canadians would be shocked at the light sentence given Durrani. He explained that is why Canadian lawmakers recently voted to change the "two for one" credit from the nation's Criminal Code which gives criminals extra credit for time served prior to conviction.

Also on Thursday, another conspirator, Shareef Abdelhaleem, 34, of Mississauga, was convicted in connection with the terror plot. His attorney presented no evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. On Monday, defense counsel is expected to present arguments that Abdelhaleem was "entrapped."

Testimony during last year's trial of some of the conspirators showed that they were indoctrinated by listening to Al Qaeda-linked Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki. As reported previously by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, Al-Awlaki has been connected to the case of the U.S. Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Malik Hasan.

Macleans.Ca magazine has just published a must-read profile of Shaher Elsohemy, the informant who enabled the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to infiltrate the "Toronto 18." Read it here.

Four other individuals accused of participating in the "Toronto 18" plot are scheduled for trial in March.

True Beneficiaries of Viva Palestina Aid Uncovered (hint: it's not the Palestinian people)

The latest Viva Palestina convoy to Gaza left behind $1 million in U.S. dollars and vehicles loaded with various supplies. A Palestinian media report says Hamas political and terrorist leaders now are fighting over those assets.

The Voice of Palestine, a news agency run by Fatah (the governing Palestinian body in the West Bank), issued a report on January 19, 2010 which sheds light on the distribution of VP "aid." Fatah and Hamas are political rivals and have waged a violent power struggle. The story, translated by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, describes the conflict between the political and militant leaders of Hamas.

According to the article titled "al Ja'abri Bursts Into Haniyeh's Office and Steals Documents and Files Concerning Huge Amounts of Money," Ahmad al Ja'abari, the head of the Qassam brigades – the Hamas military wing – became engaged in a heated argument with Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh over the distribution of Viva Palestinian funds. At one point, Ja'abari demanded to see the money that had been given to Hamas by Galloway's group, and then:

"al Ja'abari immediately removed $600,000 and returned the rest. He said to Haniyeh 'We'll go with this amount for the time being. Don't forget that al Qassam's share is greater than your shares. What you collect from the people is enough for you…and don't forget our share of the vehicles."

As we previously reported, the third Viva Palestina (VP) convoy arrived in the Gaza Strip, delivering what it termed "humanitarian aid" to the Palestinian government run by Hamas. Now, with the convoy having departed Gaza and the supplies beginning to be meted out, the actual beneficiaries of the financial and logistical support are becoming clear. Not only were the funds given to Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, but they are being withheld from the Palestinian people to support Hamas militants.

Despite clearly proclaiming their intentions to support Hamas, groups such as VP have often gotten a pass because they relied on the largely debunked myth that terrorist groups have "wings," and that it is possible to aid the humanitarian efforts of a group without necessarily supporting its terrorist activity. For anybody who still clings to this fallacy, events this week in the Gaza Strip should serve as a wake-up call.

Although the revelation of this meeting is enlightening on a number of fronts, there is at least point of note that cannot be avoided—any group which gives money to a terrorist organization under the guise of supporting humanitarian missions is willfully ignoring facts if they believe that their money won't end up supporting acts of violence.

Read more in our report on Viva Palestina here.

Al Qaida Continues to Evolve

American intelligence and law enforcement personnel are on heightened alert because of the potential threat from Islamic extremists carrying American passports. This is one of the many findings in a recent report on al Qaida issue by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The report, released Wednesday, provides a detailed overview of the evolution of al Qaida since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite finding that U.S. and allied operations have largely pushed al Qaida out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and crippled financial and popular support for the group around the world, the report cautions that the terrorist organization remains a threat to U.S. interests. Of note, the report highlights both the decentralized nature of al Qaida today and changes in recruitment tactics as causes for concern.

Although al Qaida has been hit hard by military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, new cells and allied groups have arisen in North Africa, Southeast Asia, Somalia and Yemen. As CIA Director Leon Panetta explained in 2009,

"Somalia is a failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that both could become safe havens for al Qaida."

Bearing this out is the recent establishment of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the organization that claimed credit for the attempted Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253.

Just as troubling as the re-establishment of al Qaida in Yemen are the tactics of AQAP. As the report explains, AQAP is:

"an ambitious organization capable of using non-traditional recruits to launch attacks against American targets within the Middle East and beyond."

It is this second issue that should be of increasing concern to U.S. counterterrorism officials. Proving its adaptability, al Qaida is actively seeking to recruit American citizens to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States. Currently, at least three dozen Americans who were radicalized in U.S. prisons are residing in Yemen, with some of them having gone "off the radar" and suspected of having traveled to terrorist training camps.

The "Last Tactical Mile"—Senate Investigates Intelligence Failures

In an effort to learn from the failures of the attempted Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Flight 253, the Senate held its first round of hearings this morning. Titled, Intelligence Reform: the Lessons and Implications of the Christmas Day Attack" the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs brought together a panel of leaders from the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence communities to discuss the attack and what can and will be done to prevent similar attempts in the future.

Today's hearing comes on the heels of a White House report detailing the intelligence failures leading to the Christmas Day attempt. The earlier report found a (i) failure of intelligence analysis; (ii) a failure to assign responsibility and accountability; and (iii) failing to identify intelligence. If the prepared testimony of Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, is any indication, today's hearing will be equally critical of U.S. national security efforts.

In a candid assessment of intelligence policies leading up to the Christmas day attack, Blair and Leiter explained:

"Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab should not have stepped on that plane. The counterterrorism system failed and I told the President we are determined to do better."

The testimony then goes on to describe in detail many of the failures that led to Abdulmutallab being allowed to board the Northwest flight. The intelligence community knew that al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was planning attacks against U.S. targets, knew that AQAP was working with an individual who fit the description of Abdulmutallab, and knew that the organization might try to use the type of explosive device used. Among the conclusions of these officials is that unlike the pre-9/11 intelligence community,

"this was not a failure to collect or share intelligence; rather it was a failure to connect, integrate, and understand the intelligence we had…despite our successes in identifying the overall themes that described the plot, we failed to make the final connection—the 'last tactical mile'—linking Abdulmutallab's identity to the plot."

In addition to the prepared testimony of Blair and Leiter, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano is schedule to address the committee. Additionally, the next round of hearings, whose panelists have not yet been named, will be on Tuesday.

Compensating Victims of Terrorism—America v. Great Britain

Home Secretary Alan Johnson announced new plans Tuesday to ensure that British citizens injured in terrorist attacks are compensated for their injuries. The new law, the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme, is the most recent attempt by Western nations to ensure that civilians are not left without any recourse in the aftermath of a terrorist act.

As we have previously intimated, one of the most common ways that American victims of terrorism have sought recourse for their injuries is through civil suits against Foreign Terrorist Organizations and their support structure. The U.S. government has also implemented the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, which provides financial assistance to victims.

Like the American program, the British proposal, which will retroactively cover attacks dating back to January 2002, will provide a means of compensation outside of the courtroom. As Justice Secretary Jack Straw explained in announcing the program:

"Terrorism is intended as a political statement and an attack on society as a whole. Therefore it is right that, as a tangible expression of sympathy, society should compensate the victims of terrorist attacks abroad in recognition of the injuries suffered."

The British compensation program will apply to all acts of terrorism that occur outside of the United Kingdom. The amount of compensation, available only to British citizens, will be determined based upon a number of factors including the severity of the injuries sustained.

Many of the details remain murky, however, the broad contours of the program that have been announced reveal a concerted effort to ensure that British victims of terrorism are given the financial support necessary to deal with the physical and emotional costs of an act of terrorism.

Jasser: Don't Scapegoat Officers over Fort Hood

Following reports that members of the U.S. military may face reprimands for their handling of the Nidal Malik Hasan case, Dr. Zuhdi Jasser is urging Defense Secretary Robert Gates not to "scapegoat" military personnel in connection with the Fort Hood massacre investigation.

"The ideology of political Islam is at the heart of the Fort Hood incident," Jasser observes. Yet former Army Secretary Togo West and Admiral Vern Clark, authors of a new Defense Department report on the military's handling of Fort Hood, he says, "have failed to publicly address the Islamist roots of the shootings."

Asked by reporters at the Pentagon if the immediate problem at Fort Hood had been Islamist radicalization, West dismissed the question, saying "radicalization of any sort" is the issue and that "our concern is with actions and effects, not necessarily with motivations."

Yet Gates acknowledged January 15 that "Current policies on prohibited activities neither provide the authority nor the tools for commanders and supervisors to intervene when DoD personnel [are] at risk of personal radicalization."

Hasan, who is charged with 13 counts of murder and 32 counts of attempted murder in connection with the November 5 rampage, routinely received favorable performance reviews and kept his security clearance. He continued to rise through the ranks despite poor performance and giving a bizarre presentation that appeared to justify terrorist attacks. Some of his colleagues wondered whether Hasan was psychotic.

According to Jasser, chairman of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy and a Navy veteran, the malfeasance of Hasan's superiors was not the primary reason for the military's failure to act before the massacre. The crux of the problem, Jasser says, is the military's "political correctness in its handling of Islamist radicalization issues."

The military needs to come up with "specific guidelines and directives for supervising officers" that provide what "has been glaringly missing: guidance and support with regards to various ideological warning signs which Islamists may harbor in the ranks of the military, DoD and other branches of government, " Jasser writes.

"To scapegoat those officers without addressing the pathologies and the impact of the climate in which they operate compounds the problem rather than solves it," Jasser says. "Our greatest liability is not those officers but the politically correct climate in America today which is negligently blind to the threat of political Islam. Secretary Gates cannot let this stand and we cannot ignore the impact of victim-mongering, litigious organizations like [Council on American-Islamic Relations] CAIR and their Islamist brethren."

The military "cannot allow the mantra of victimization of Muslims to dominate how it handles force protection," Jasser warns. "If the military's solution is to scapegoat these soldiers instead of fighting the root problem we will see many more Nidal Harsens."

Read more about the Hasan and the Fort Hood investigation here.

A New Strategy for Combating Terrorism

On Tuesday, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced the creation of the Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking Unit. The new unit, which will merge the experience and expertise of the Terrorism and National Security and the International Narcotics Trafficking units, is a significant step in modernizing American counter-terrorism programs.

The connection between terrorist groups and narcotics traffickers is nothing new. Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the United Self Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) have funded their guerrilla war largely through kidnapping and cocaine production. Similarly, the Taliban has relied upon the opium trade and Hezbollah has relied upon drug trafficking to finance their violent acts. Late last year, the Justice Department announced the arrest and indictment of three men for agreeing to transport cocaine throughout West and North Africa with the intent to support three terrorist organizations—Al Qaida, Al Qaida in the Islamic Magreb, and the FARC.

Recognizing that Islamic terrorist organizations are increasingly turning to the drug trade to finance their violent acts, the new unit in Manhattan will be uniquely qualified to combat this growing trend. As U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara explained, its mission will be "the investigation and prosecution of transnational acts of terrorism, narco-terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering, which threatens U.S. national security." Undoubtedly, this new office will make it more difficult for terrorist groups to use narcotics trafficking to finance their terrorist operations.

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